Payload Safety Review and Data Submittal Requirements

For Payloads Using the:
- Space Shuttle
- International Space Station

July 1998

National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center

Formerly: NSTS 13830, "Implementation Procedure for NSTS Payloads System Safety Requirements for Payloads Using the Space Transportation System"
DESCRIPTION OF CHANGES TO
PAYLOAD SAFETY REVIEW AND
DATA SUBMITTAL REQUIREMENTS

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Note: Dates reflect latest signature date of CR's received by PILS.
This requirements document assists organizations that are developing payloads intended for flight on the International Space Station (ISS) and/or Space Shuttle to comply with system safety requirements established by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The requirements for safety analyses and assessment reviews are explained in detail for flight safety and ground safety. Flight safety reviews are performed by the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP), and ground safety reviews are performed by the John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Ground Safety Review Panel (GSRP). Instructions are given for documenting compliance with the safety requirements.


Signed by Richard N. Richards  
Richard N. Richards  
Manager, Space Shuttle 
Program Integration  
Johnson Space Center  

Signed by Jay H. Greene  
Jay H. Greene  
Deputy Manager for Technical Development, International Space Station Program  
Johnson Space Center  

Signed by P. Thomas Breakfield, III  
P. Thomas Breakfield, III  
Director of Safety and Mission Assurance  
Kennedy Space Center
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION

Implementation of the payload safety process is the joint responsibility of the Payload Organization (PO); the flight operator, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC); and the launch/landing site operator, John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC).

The International Space Station (ISS) and Space Shuttle Program (SSP) safety policies and requirements for ISS and Shuttle payloads are specified in the current version of NSTS 1700.7 “Safety Policy and Requirements for Payloads Using the Space Transportation System” and the current version of the NSTS 1700.7 ISS Addendum, “Safety Policy and Requirements for Payloads Using the International Space Station.” In addition, unique ground safety policies and requirements are specified in the current version of 45 SPW HB S-100/KHB 1700.7, “Space Shuttle Payload Ground Safety Handbook.” These documents require the PO to conduct a systematic safety analysis and to document and submit a Safety Data Package (SDP) in support of safety reviews to be conducted by the flight operator (JSC) and the launch/landing site operator (KSC).

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Headquarters has assigned the responsibility to review submitted payload safety documentation to the Space Shuttle and Space Station Program Directors at JSC and the Director of Safety and Mission Assurance at KSC. The JSC Payload Safety Review Panel (PSRP) will assess the payload design and flight operations; the KSC Ground Safety Review Panel (GSRP) will assess the Ground Support Equipment (GSE) design and ground operations. These two panels were formed to accomplish the following:

- Assure that PO interpretation of the safety requirements is consistent with NASA payload safety policy.
- Conduct safety reviews as appropriate during the development of the payload, associated GSE, and related operations.
- Evaluate hazard analyses and Noncompliance Reports (NCRs).
- Negotiate the resolution of safety issues involving design and operation to ensure compliance with all applicable safety requirements.
- Assess payload design features that have been implemented for controlling identified hazards and the verification approach that confirms intended system performance.
SECTION 2
PURPOSE

The purpose of this document is to define the payload safety review process in order to assist the Shuttle/ISS POs in documenting compliance with the payload requirements documents specified in section 1. Specifically, this document accomplishes the following:

- Defines the safety reviews necessary to comply with the system safety requirements that are applicable to payload design, flight operations, GSE design, and ground operations for both ISS and Space Shuttle.
- Identifies the required content of the SDP.
- Describes preparation for and conduct of the safety review.
- Establishes the timeline for data submittal and establishes the depth of detail required for the various submittals.
- Explains safety review process variations.
- Defines the payload series/reflight review process.
SECTION 3
SCOPE

Data submittal requirements included herein apply to hardware being submitted to both the PSRP and the GSRP unless specified otherwise. This document outlines the minimum data submittal requirements; the PSRP and the GSRP reserve the right to request additional data as deemed necessary to support safety documentation.

The objective of the safety review process is to review the payload, GSE, and operations for adequate safety implementation. The mission success and any scientific objectives of the payload are the responsibility of the PO and are beyond the scope of this document and process.

This document does not establish design requirements.

3.1 APPLICABLE HARDWARE

This document applies, but is not limited to, the following payload hardware that flies/operates on the Space Shuttle and/or ISS during any mission phase (prelaunch, launch, ascent, on-orbit, entry, landing, or postlanding):

- New Payload Hardware
- Existing (reflown and series) Payload Hardware
- Hardware Associated with Developmental Test Objectives (DTOs), Detailed Supplemental Objectives (DSOs), Risk Mitigation Experiments (RMEs), Space Medicine Program (SMP), and Human Exploration and Development of Space Technology Demonstrations (HTDs) Experiment Hardware

The document also applies, but is not limited to, the following payload-related hardware:

- Government-Furnished Equipment (GFE)
- Airborne Support Equipment (ASE)
- GSE

3.2 EXPORT CONTROL

The PSRP complies with the United States export control laws and regulations as established by the U.S. Department of Commerce in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) and the U.S. Department of State in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). The PSRP also complies with the Space Shuttle Program’s export control policy in NSTS 07700 Volume V and the ISSP’s export control policy in SSP 50223.
Export control factors significantly into two areas of the payload safety review process:

- Distribution of Payload Data
- Conduct of Safety Reviews

The PSRP Executive Secretary serves as the primary exporter of payload data to the ISS International Partners (IPs) and other foreign persons in support of the payload safety review process. Payload data includes safety data packages, hazard reports, safety review presentation materials, and other payload related information. Specific export control data submittal requirements for payload organizations are listed in section 4.3.1.5 of this document.

The PSRP Executive Secretary takes special precautions when conducting safety reviews for payloads under export control restrictions. These precautions may include restricting attendance, limiting presentation materials, posting signs, or conducting the review in a secure facility.
SECTION 4
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION

The PO is responsible for assuring the safety of its payload and for complying with the safety requirements contained in the technical requirements documents cited in section 1. To this end, the PO must accomplish the following:

- Perform a Safety Analysis
- Identify Hazards
- Document Compliance with the Safety Requirements
- Present the Documentation to the PSRP/GSRP

4.1 SAFETY ANALYSIS

To meet the requirements of the current version of NSTS 1700.7 and NSTS 1700.7 ISS Addendum, paragraph 301, the PO shall perform a safety analysis of the payload and GSE. The analysis shall consider hardware design, verification, testing, and flight/ground operations. The safety analysis shall begin during the payload concept phase and shall be refined and expanded as the design matures. For situations in which payload hardware will be installed or reconfigured on-orbit or in which the payload will be on-orbit for an extended time, safety analyses shall consider the necessity of on-orbit verification/reverification of hazard controls.

4.1.1 Level of Analysis

In order to identify the hazards applicable to a payload, the PO shall conduct safety analyses both at the system and subsystem levels. Each system and subsystem shall be evaluated to determine the applicability of each technical safety requirement.

Selection of subsystem groupings varies and any convenient grouping may be used. The following is a suggested list of subsystems: biomedical, caution and warning, cryogenic, electrical, environmental control, human factors, hydraulics, materials, mechanical, optical, pressure systems, propulsion, pyrotechnics, radiation, and structures.

For hardware developed for or provided to the PO, the PO shall:

- Obtain the appropriate safety data from the supplier or conduct an independent safety analysis.
- Conduct a safety analysis of the interfaces between the subject hardware and other elements.

4.1.2 Analysis Techniques

Depending on the complexity of the payload, the PO should use established analytical techniques (e.g., preliminary hazard, sneak circuit, fault tree, operational hazard, and failure modes and effects analyses) to obtain the data necessary to complete, present, and support payload hazard reports.
4.1.3 Safety Verifications for Payloads with Catastrophic Hazard Potential (Flight Only)

The current version of NSTS/ISS 18798 specifies data requirements to document the verification program for payload systems/subsystems that have catastrophic hazard potential. An excerpt from this document is included below for convenience.

Table 4-1. - NSTS/ISS 18798

<table>
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<th>All payload systems having catastrophic hazard potential for the orbiter or crew as a result of operations in or near the orbiter must use hardware and procedures that have been subjected to a rigorous verification program. Verification programs normally require testing to verify adequate performance margins under all environmental conditions (qualification testing) as well as demonstrating intended system performance on flight hardware. Comprehensive system-level testing on payload flight hardware supported by qualification test on protoflight or flight type hardware are the preferred verification methods. It is essential that payload system performance be verified from the input stimuli to the end function.</th>
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<td>Safety-critical system performance that cannot be verified by test shall be verified by independent parties using dissimilar analysis techniques whenever possible. Single party analytical efforts can be used to verify performance only when the methodology is widely accepted and conservative margins are applied to the results.</td>
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<td>The payload organization must focus its attention to all parts of the payload verification program and orbiter interface verification activities to assure that the sub-elements of the total verification program are integrated into a comprehensive system verification effort that confirms the intended system performance. When the use of ground test equipment (apparatus) is required to replace flight hardware functions, verification methods shall be developed by engineering personnel independent from those designing the flight system. Test requirements, procedures, and test apparatus shall be derived from intended functional requirements rather than from the design, and all items must be maintained under strict configuration control. The payload organization is responsible for developing and presenting sufficient data to the PSRP [GSRP] to substantiate that the test requirements, procedures, and test apparatus will provide an adequate simulation in substitution for the end function.</td>
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4.2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

The primary objectives of the safety review process are to identify the potential hazards applicable to a payload, including its flight, GSE, and ground operations, and to assure that the hazard controls and verifications (including on-orbit verification/reverification of hazard controls where applicable) are adequate and in compliance with the safety requirements. To assist the PO in accomplishing these objectives, appropriate safety terminology has been defined in the current version of NSTS 1700.7.

Although not exhaustive, the following is a list of some previously identified flight hazard groups that have been used on hazard reports: collision, contamination, corrosion, electrical shock, explosion, fire, injury and illness, loss of orbiter entry capability, and inability to egress.
The following are basic hazard groups applicable to ground operations: structural failure of support structures and handling equipment; collision during handling; inadvertent release of corrosive, toxic, flammable, or cryogenic fluids; loss of habitable/breathable atmosphere; inadvertent activation of ordnance devices; ignition of flammable atmosphere/material; electrical shock/burns; personnel exposure to excessive levels of ionizing or nonionizing radiation; use of hazardous/incompatible GSE materials; inadvertent deployment of appendages; working under suspended loads; and rupture of composite epoxy overwrapped pressure vessels.

4.3 DOCUMENTATION OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

The safety analysis results shall be documented in the SDP, which includes applicable payload hazard report forms (JSC Form 542B and JSC Form 1230) and presented to both the JSC PSRP and the KSC GSRP as described in this document. Guidelines for completing the flight hazard report forms and preparing the SDPs are found in JSC 26943, “Guidelines for the Preparation of Payload Flight Safety Data Packages and Hazard Reports for Payloads Using the Space Shuttle,” current issue.

For SDP preparation, the PO is responsible for using the current version of all applicable forms and safety documentation. The PO may verify current forms/documents by contacting the Executive Secretary to the PSRP or the Chairman of the GSRP. These forms are listed in section 11.

4.3.1 Data Submittals

Although there will be some duplication of material contained in data submittals prepared for PSRP and GSRP reviews, each package serves a different purpose and must stand alone.

Data submittals, which may include SDPs and other supporting information (e.g., action item responses), should identify the flight on which the payload is manifested (if known) and be formally submitted in English to the Executive Secretary, PSRP, or the Executive Secretariat, GSRP. Data should be formally transmitted under the signature of the Program Manager.

Safety review meetings are scheduled to be held approximately 45 calendar days after receipt of an acceptable SDP (i.e., an SDP that satisfies all the requirements in this document).

The SDP will be made available to the PSRP/GSRP members and various other NASA/contractor technical and administrative personnel who support the Panels. For ISS payloads, this may include International Partner representatives to the PSRP.

Payload safety data must be submitted electronically via the Internet using the Payload Safety Data Management System (DMS) located at the following URL:

http://psrp.jsc.nasa.gov

The DMS System Administrator (tel. 281-483-9078) can provide information on acceptable software applications, electronic addresses, detailed login instructions, and system procedures. POs may also access the DMS via a hyperlink at the top of the Payload Safety homepage located at the following URL:
http://wwwsrqa.jsc.nasa.gov/pce

POs must obtain approval from the PSRP Executive Secretary or Executive Secretariat, GSRP to submit flight or ground safety data, respectively, by alternate means or to submit supplementary data in hard copy format. Hard copy submittals must be single-sided and sequentially paginated from the cover sheet to the last page of the package.

Once the SDP has been electronically submitted, the PO must send the transmittal letters, document signature pages, and signed original Hazard Reports (HRs) to the appropriate Panel contact:

Executive Secretary, PSRP
NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center
Mail Code NC4
2101 NASA Road 1
Houston, TX  77058-3696

Executive Secretariat, GSRP
NASA John B. Kennedy Space Center
Mail Code UB-F3
Kennedy Space Center, FL  32899-0001
4.3.1.1 Submittal of Proprietary Data

If proprietary data are submitted in the SDP, the transmittal letter must include the following statement:

This payload safety data package contains proprietary data on the following pages: [list the appropriate page numbers]. [Insert name of the payload organization] acknowledges awareness and acceptance of the GSRP and the PSRP’s policies and methods of processing proprietary data. [Insert name of the payload organization] also will provide any additional protective measures it deems necessary over and above that provided by the panels during meetings.

The transmittal letter and the first page of the SDP must identify the specific pages that contain proprietary information. Insert the word “PROPRIETARY” at the top and bottom of each page that contains proprietary data. The word “PROPRIETARY” shall be in all capital letters in a large font size and style that is easily discernible from the rest of the text.

In addition to the proper submittal of proprietary information, the PO should be aware of the following while attending PSRP/GSRP safety reviews, Technical Interchange Meetings (TIMs), and action item closure meetings:

• PSRP/GSRP meetings are not conducted in secure facilities. Thus, when it is necessary to recess meetings (e.g., lunch and breaks), the POs will be responsible for protecting any proprietary data distributed during the meeting (other than that logged and distributed by NASA as part of the SDP).

• If any proprietary data are to be presented or discussed during the meeting, prior to the meeting the PO will notify the PSRP Executive Secretary/GSRP Chairman who will then make arrangements to monitor attendance, close the doors, and post a sign noting that access to the meeting is controlled.

• The PO will be responsible for retrieval and disposition of any proprietary material distributed at the meeting (other than that logged and distributed by NASA as part of the SDP), with the exception that two copies of proprietary material distributed by the PO at the meeting will be retained by the PSRP/GSRP in a protected file.

When the PSRP/GSRP receives proprietary data included in the SDPs, such data will be handled in a manner that will protect the interests of the PO. These procedures include tracking distributed materials, protecting files, and restricting reproduction. In order to exercise reasonable care in protecting proprietary data in connection with the payload safety review process, NASA will ensure that proprietary data are distributed only to persons who have a need to review such data in support of panel functions. Furthermore, distributed data that is returned to the PSRP Executive Secretary/GSRP Chairman after use will be destroyed via the NASA secure disposal process.
The protection of material marked “PROPRIETARY” creates an added burden on the PSRP/GSRP review support system, so the PO should mark only those items that are proprietary. The PO should coordinate with the PSRP Executive Secretary/GSRP Chairman to explore such alternatives as providing the proprietary material in a separate package when it is a very small portion of the overall SDP. If a separate, proprietary briefing package (not contained in the SDP) is to be presented to the PSRP/GSRP during the review, the PO shall provide at least 20 copies of such material for distribution at the review.

If the PO discovers that some portion of the SDP marked “PROPRIETARY” is no longer considered such, the PO must inform the PSRP Executive Secretary and/or the GSRP Chairman in writing.

4.3.1.2 Submittal of Copyrighted Data

Payload organizations are hereby informed that payload documentation submitted to NASA must be reproduced and distributed to the members of the PSRP/GSRP and to associated technical support personnel. Accordingly, copyrighted data shall not be included in the submitted documentation unless the PO 1) identifies such copyrighted data, and 2) grants to the Government, or acquires on behalf of the Government, a license to reproduce and distribute the data to these necessary recipients.

4.3.1.3 Submittal of Translated Data

For all documents submitted by the PO to the PSRP/GSRP that have been translated into English, the English translation shall be the official document.

4.3.1.4 Submittal of Toxicological Data for SSP and ISS Payloads (Flight Only)

The Shuttle/ISS payload safety review process requires biomedical safety assessments of potentially hazardous materials, such as chemicals, microorganisms, and radioisotopes. In order for these assessments to be available for the safety reviews, the JSC Toxicology Group requires POs to submit test sample data substantially in advance of the safety reviews. See JSC 27472, “Requirements for Submission of Test Sample-Materials Data for Shuttle Payload Safety Evaluations,” current issue, for the timeline and data requirements for these early submittals. The PO must attach both the data submitted to JSC Toxicology Group and the JSC response (when available) to the applicable hazard report that is a part of the SDP. Should toxicology submittals involve proprietary data, see section 4.3.1.1.

4.3.1.5 Submittal of Export Control Data (Flight Only)

The export control data submittal requirements in sections 4.3.1.5.1 and 4.3.1.5.2 apply to U.S. payload organizations only. IP payload organizations are not required to provide the U.S. export control classification of their safety data packages. In the event that an IP SDP requires a U.S. export control classification, NASA export control resources will be used to classify the SDP.
4.3.1.5.1 ISS Payloads

Distribution of ISS payload safety data packages to the ISS IPs is a standard part of the payload safety review process.

The PO must identify the export control classification of the SDP payload data in its transmittal letter. The first page of the SDP must also identify the export control classification of the data.

The PSRP Executive Secretary will not distribute an SDP with an unknown export control classification to the IPs. Safety reviews may be delayed or cancelled for ISS payloads with unresolved export control issues.

The PO’s safety review presentation materials must have the same export control classification as the SDP submitted for review or a less restrictive export control classification.

4.3.1.5.2 Shuttle Payloads

Distribution of Shuttle payload safety data packages to the ISS IPs is not a standard part of the payload safety review process.

Shuttle payload safety data packages are not distributed to the IPs unless the PSRP identifies a specific need to do so. If a need is identified, the PSRP Executive Secretary will work with the PO and the SSP’s export control resources to obtain the export control classification of the SDP.

The PO may include the export control classification of the SDP payload data in its transmittal letter and on the first page of the SDP, if the classification is known prior to SDP submittal.

4.3.2 Hazard Reports

The purpose of the hazard reports is to document the PO’s safety assessment in a manner that reflects how the payload design demonstrates compliance with the safety requirements. The hazard reports are used as a method to systematically assess compliance with the safety requirements.

The flight SDP submittal must contain all flight hazard reports; the ground SDP submittal must contain all ground hazard reports. Each hazard report must be signed and dated by the payload program manager prior to submittal. Hazard reports shall be prepared on JSC Form 542B, JSC Form 542B-1, or JSC Form 1230 (see section 11) or an equivalent form that contains all information required on the JSC forms. Section 7, organized by area of design, identifies minimum support data for flight hazard reports. JSC 26943 contains guidelines for preparing payload flight hazard reports.
Following any technical discussion, the PSRP/GSRP Chairman will provide a disposition for each hazard report. This disposition may take one of the following forms: 1) approved as written, 2) approved with modification, 3) approved with an action to be performed by the PO and/or PSRP/GSRP, and 4) not approved.

The PO is responsible for retaining and maintaining the original hazard reports after approval.

4.4 SAFETY REVIEW PRESENTATION

The PO should be prepared to present information submitted in the SDP to the appropriate safety panel during scheduled reviews (see sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2). During reviews, the PO should provide briefing chart handouts sufficient for the number of people expected to attend the review.
SECTION 5
SAFETY REVIEW OVERVIEW

5.1 LOCATION

Safety reviews for payload design and flight operations are usually conducted at JSC. The safety reviews for GSE design and ground operations will normally be conducted at KSC. The PO shall coordinate the timing of the PSRP reviews with the PSRP Executive Secretary. The PO shall coordinate the timing and location of the GSRP reviews with the GSRP Chairman.

5.2 INITIAL CONTACT MEETING

The PO may receive initial contact safety briefings by the JSC and KSC safety representatives. The JSC briefing, normally held during the first integration meeting at JSC, should be scheduled by contacting the Payload Integration Manager (PIM) at JSC. For ISS payloads, contact the ISS PIM. The KSC briefing is usually held in conjunction with the first Ground Operations Working Group (GOWG) meeting, which is scheduled through the Launch Site Support Manager Integration Manager (LSIM) at KSC.

The briefing includes an overview of the technical and system safety requirements to be met by the PO, plus instructions for conducting the safety reviews. The PO should provide a schedule of payload milestones and request a phase 0 or phase I safety review when the payload design concept has been developed.

5.3 TYPES OF MEETINGS

Safety reviews may take place in person, via teleconference, or by correspondence. Review meetings may be formal or out-of-board as deemed appropriate by the Panel Chairman.

- **Formal Meeting:** Formal meetings constitute a gathering of the safety review panel, representatives of the PO, and the appropriate supporting technical staff.

- **Out-of-Board Meeting:** Out-of-board meetings do not require the full safety panel. Attendees may include the Panel Chairman, Safety representative(s), representatives of the PO, and others necessary to address the issues that may be involved.

- **Safety TIM:** The review panel and/or associated technical staff may convene upon request in order to assist in interpreting safety requirements or to coordinate safety analyses/issues prior to safety reviews. Requests for flight safety TIMs should be coordinated with the PSRP Executive Secretary. Requests for Ground Safety TIMs should be coordinated with the GSRP Chairman. Material to be addressed during the TIM should be provided 14 calendar days prior to the TIM.

- **Splinter Meetings:** Splinter meetings may be held concurrently with a safety review to discuss detailed technical concerns.
5.4 PAYLOAD CATEGORIES

Traditional payload safety compliance assessment is accomplished using a phased safety review process (phases 0, I, II, III) that corresponds to the hardware conceptual, preliminary, and critical design review phases and verification/validation of the payload (see section 6). Successful completion of each safety phase is documented by SDP/HR submittals to and approval by the PSRP/GSRP.

To streamline this process, the PSRP has implemented procedures and data requirements to minimize formal PSRP review time for payloads with routine hazards/standard controls/verifications. This allows the PSRP to concentrate review time on payload systems with the highest hazard potential, “must-work” functions, and/or nonstandard controls and verification methods. POs may document routine hazards and standard controls and verifications on the JSC Form 1230, “Flight Payload Standardized Hazard Control Report.”

Based on the phase I SDP, new payloads are categorized by the PSRP into one of three categories of complexity (basic, intermediate, or complex) with respect to hazard potential as shown in Table 5-1 below. The review process is then tailored to the complexity of the payload design and adequacy of documentation. In addition, the process permits all payloads to document standard hazards that have standard controls and verifications on JSC Form 1230, which may be approved by the PSRP without a formal PSRP meeting. Details concerning basic and intermediate categories are contained in sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2, respectively. Complex payloads use the review process detailed in section 6. Reflown and series payloads use the review process outlined in section 9.

Table 5-1. - PAYLOAD CATEGORIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Payload Category</th>
<th>Defined Hazards</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic</td>
<td>The only hazards identified are “standard” as specified on the JSC Form 1230. The appropriate hazard controls are found on JSC Form 1230.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>1) The payload has “unique” hazards (i.e., hazards not found on the JSC Form 1230) but has controls and verification methods that have been historically accepted by the PSRP OR 2) The payload has “standard” hazards (i.e., hazards identified on the JSC Form 1230) but uses controls and verification methods other than those identified on the JSC Form 1230.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Complex</td>
<td>The payload has unique hazards with hazard controls that are: a. Active “must work” functions, such as electromechanical or pyrotechnic separation systems or actuators/mechanisms providing structural load paths, OR b. Nonstandard or have nonstandard verification methods that depart from historically accepted techniques, OR c. Operationally complex requiring flight or ground personnel intervention to assist in controlling the hazard.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If, after a payload category has been assigned, the PO a) identifies previously undefined hazards or b) implements design changes that may create new hazards, the PO must submit a revised SDP, which may result in a reclassification of the payload category.

5.4.1 Review Process for Basic Payloads (Flight Only)

Basic payloads (see Table 5-1, above) have a very low level of complexity, which may allow the payload to complete the safety process out of board. However, the PO will submit an SDP that will document the applicable hazards, controls, and verifications. Submittal will follow the standard procedure detailed in section 4.3.1, and approval may be obtained without a meeting. The following data are required for the simplified SDP for hardware design and flight operations:

- Brief description of the hardware design and flight operations with schematics and block diagrams, as appropriate
- Summary of the safety analysis results that documents compliance with the design, verification, and applicable on-orbit verification/reverification requirements for the identified standard hazards
- Documentation of all applicable hazards, controls, and verifications on hazard report(s) (e.g., JSC Form 1230/Form 542)
- Certificate of Payload Safety Compliance (JSC Form 1114A) signed by the Program Manager

5.4.2 Review Process for Intermediate Payloads (Flight Only)

In addition to the standard hazards found in Basic payloads, the Intermediate payload has unique hazards that have standard controls and verification methods (including applicable on-orbit verifications/reverifications) that have been historically accepted by the PSRP. Intermediate category payloads should require one or two reviews of the unique hazards, but the basic hazards may be addressed on a Form 1230 and approved out of board. The PSRP will determine the need for a second review for unique hazards at the completion of the first review. The determination will be based primarily upon the completeness and quality of the unique hazard reports. Requirements for SDP submittal are the same as those stated in section 4.3.1.

5.5 SCHEDULE OF REVIEWS/PHASES

The schedule for formal phase 0, I, and II payload safety reviews generally relates to the payload development schedule. Phase 0 is held during the concept phase or at the start of payload design. Phase I is near the Preliminary Design Review (PDR); phase II is near the Critical Design Review (CDR). The PO should set the review schedule to obtain maximum benefit to payload development based on the results of the safety reviews.

ISS payloads may include multiple major systems or components, each working to a unique schedule. These may be individually baselined and categorized (see section 5.4), which allows them to progress through the payload safety process in accordance with their own schedule (see section 8.2).
Phase III is associated with completion of payload safety verifications and/or the start of ground processing. When establishing a timeline for phase III, the PO should allow enough time to close potential issues that may result from a phase III review. The timing and completion of the phase III review and safety certification are critical to the launch schedule. The flight and ground phase III completion requirements restated below are in the current version of NSTS 1700.7 and NSTS 1700.7 ISS Addendum and apply to all payloads:

The JSC and KSC Phase III safety review and ground safety certification must be completed 30 days prior to delivery of the payload, ASE, and GSE to the launch site…

If any verification items remain open on the flight hazard reports, the PO must provide rationale to support the safety of starting ground processing with these items open. The rationale is to be submitted to both the PSRP and GSRP. The PSRP will review the rationale and provide concurrence to the GSRP.

To schedule KSC Ground safety reviews, contact the GSRP Chairman; to schedule JSC Flight safety reviews, contact the PSRP Executive Secretary (see section 4.3.1).

5.6 SAFETY REVIEW COMPLETION

5.6.1 Documentation of Phase Completion

During a formal meeting, the Panel Chairman will make an official announcement that the safety phase is complete or incomplete (open). This announcement will be recorded and distributed by the PSRP/GSRP in the official meeting minutes. Incomplete phases are usually attributable to overdue/open action items or unsigned (open) hazard reports. The PSRP/GSRP will issue official correspondence to document closure of open action items/signature of open hazard reports that occurs after the phase review. The correspondence that closes the last open action item/hazard report for that phase will include a statement that the safety phase is considered complete.

For out-of-board reviews, safety review process completion will be documented by formal correspondence.

5.6.2 Completion Criteria for Phase I, II, and III

Successful completion of phase I and II reviews is accomplished by obtaining approval (Panel Chairman’s signature) of hazard reports at the appropriate phase level and closure of applicable phase I/II action items.

After submission of all required data, the criteria for successful completion of the safety review process at the phase III level for both flight and ground reviews are as follows:

- All payload hazard reports are signed by the payload Program Manager and the Panel Chairman at the phase III level.
- All NCRs are approved.
- Safety review action items are formally closed in the safety review meeting minutes or documented closed in separate correspondence.
- A signed Certificate of Ground Payload Safety Compliance provided to the GSRP (for phase III ground safety).
Approval of the phase III safety data by the PSRP and GSRP is with the understanding that the data represent the actual design and operations of the payload. Should safety issues arise after the safety process is complete, the safety panels reserve the right to request additional data deemed necessary to reassess the payload.

5.6.3 Completion Criteria for Series/Reflight

The criteria for successful completion of a series or reflight safety review is that all data required by section 9, Reflighted and Series Payload Hardware, have been submitted and approved.

5.7 POST PHASE III SAFETY ACTIVITY

5.7.1 Certificate of Flight Payload Safety Compliance

The PO must present a signed Certificate of Flight Payload Safety Compliance to the PSRP Executive Secretary no later than 10 days prior to the Flight Readiness Review (FRR).

5.7.2 Configuration Control

When changes to the design, configuration, or operations of the payload are required subsequent to phase III, the PO shall assess those changes for possible safety implications, including the effect on all interfaces. The assessment shall be forwarded to the PSRP/GSRP for review and approval. If the change has ground safety implications, it must be reviewed with the KSC panel prior to proceeding with ground processing. New or revised hazard reports and support data shall be prepared where applicable and submitted for approval as indicated in section 4.3.1. The need for delta phase III safety reviews will be determined by the PSRP/GSRP Chairman. Satisfactory completion of these activities is mandatory prior to the start of affected ground activities or launch.

Any test failures, anomalies, or accidents involving payload flight hardware or software that occurs between the completion of phase III and launch must be promptly reported to the PSRP/GSRP. Safety impacts, if any, should be identified.

5.7.3 Verification Tracking Log

Open verification items must be tracked on a flight or ground safety Verification Tracking Log (VTL) (see section 11).

- Flight Safety: From Phase III until L-60 days, the PO shall update and provide the VTL to the PSRP Executive Secretary once a month. From L-60 days until launch, the PO shall provide a weekly update to the VTL. All VTL open items must be closed no later than 4 P.M. Central time on the last business day prior to launch. Items that cannot be closed at this time will require the transmission of a facsimile closing the open VTL items to the Mission Evaluation Room (MER) at NASA JSC no later than L-6 hours. Contact the PSRP Executive Secretary for MER delivery instructions.

- Ground Safety: The initial submittal of the ground safety VTL is required with the phase III ground SDP. Following the completion of the phase III review, the ground safety VTL shall be updated monthly prior to hardware arrival at KSC. If there are open flight verifications
that are constraints to ground processing, the PO must also include those items of the flight VTL. After the delivery of the payload, ASE, or GSE to the launch site, the safety VTL(s) shall be updated at least weekly. More frequent updates to the safety VTL(s) may be required if the open items must be closed to allow work to continue.

5.7.4 Documentation of Safety Process Completion

Final flight safety approval is documented by the PSRP Chairman’s signature on the Certificate of Flight Readiness (CoFR) for the planned flight.

Final ground safety approval is documented by a letter from the KSC Director, Safety Assurance to the KSC Director, Customer Service Space Station and Shuttle Payloads Processing stating that the Ground Safety Review Process has been completed and the payload may begin ground processing.
SECTION 6
SAFETY PROCESS

6.1 GENERAL

6.1.1 Preparation

In preparation for a phase safety review, the PO will submit an SDP as indicated in section 4.3.1. If phase reviews are combined (e.g., a phase I/II review), the SDP shall include the data requirements that apply to all the appropriate phases. The depth and number of the planned reviews are dependent on the complexity, technical maturity, and hazard potential of the payload, and may be modified by the Panel Chairman in conjunction with the PO.

The PO should provide sufficient technical support personnel to answer questions posed by the PSRP/GSRP in support of the agenda items.

Listed below are general agenda topics for safety review meetings. These insure that the safety review meetings proceed smoothly and contain the necessary information to facilitate the review.

6.1.2 General Meeting Agenda Guidelines

The PO should coordinate all meeting agenda with the PSRP Executive Secretary or the GSRP Chairman prior to the safety review meeting and provide the final agenda in advance. The fundamental elements of all Safety Review Meeting Agenda are as follows:

a. Introduction of the Meeting and Participants by the JSC Safety Reliability and Quality Assurance (SR&QA) Payload Safety Engineer (PSE).

b. Opening Remarks by Chairman and the Payload Program Manager.

c. Discussion of Pre-Review Activity Led by the PSE.

d. Program-level Overview (including areas of responsibility).

e. Program Milestone Schedule: Provide the Program Milestone Schedule, including, but not limited to,

   (1) design stages and reviews,
   (2) hardware/software build status,
   (3) testing and verification activities,
   (4) delivery, integration, and launch activities, and
   (5) safety review dates.

f. Mission Objectives, including overview of mission objectives and general criteria for a successful mission.
g. System/Subsystem Technical Presentation Overview, including enough information to allow the PSRP/GSRP to gain a general technical understanding of the systems involved in the payload operations. Highlight any design changes since the previous safety reviews.

h. Operations Overview, describing planned operations and known contingencies. Plan to discuss detailed operations that relate to payload safety in conjunction with the appropriate hazard report presentation. Highlight any operations changes made to the operations that impact the safety of the payload since the previous review.

i. Safety Assessment Summary, including safety assessments performed to identify hazards, any failures or anomalies that occurred after development testing, and the corrective actions. Present responses to agreements and formal action items, including a summary of open action items and associated plans for closure. Provide sufficient information to demonstrate that a comprehensive hazard analysis has been performed. Provide an overview of hazards and how they relate to the hazard reports, and discuss safety-related items that are not reflected in the hazard reports.

j. Phase-specific Topics: Additional, phase-specific topics for the agenda should be drawn from the data that are required to be included in the SDP for that phase (see sections 6.2.1, 6.3.1, 6.4.1, and 6.5.1). If not included as one of the general agenda topics, these data should be addressed as separate agenda items.

k. Hazard Report Presentation: Unless otherwise agreed to by the PSRP/GSRP, present all hazard reports in full, associated noncompliance reports/waivers/deviations, previously assigned action items/agreements that involved modification of hazard reports, and associated action item/agreement responses.

l. Action Item Review: Both the PO and the PSRP/GSRP will review and agree to actions and due dates assigned during the course of the safety review to ensure that there are no misunderstandings. These action items will be printed and signed during the review.

m. Closing Comments Payload Program Manager and Panel.

6.2 PHASE 0 SAFETY REVIEW

The optional phase 0 safety review is provided as a service to the PO. The objectives of the meeting are to:

- Assist the PO in identifying hazards, hazard causes, and applicable safety requirements early in the development of the payload.
- Adequately describe the hazard potential.
- Answer questions regarding the interpretation of the safety requirements or the implementation procedures of this document.
- Provide guidance to the PO for preparing the safety data required for subsequent safety reviews.
6.2.1 Phase 0 Data Requirements

The following data are required for the phase 0 SDP and must be submitted as stated in paragraph 4.3.1:

a. For payload design and flight operations:
   (1) Conceptual payload description (including subsystems) and mission scenario.
   (2) Description of safety-critical subsystems and their operations.
   (3) Flight hazard reports (JSC Form 542B/Form 1230).

b. For GSE design and ground operations:
   (1) Conceptual payload description and brief mission scenario.
   (2) Conceptual GSE description and operations, and description of payload design that is safety critical during ground operations.
   (3) Ground operations scenario.
   (4) Ground hazard reports (JSC Form 542B).

The description of the payload and its operation must be of sufficient detail to permit identification of all subsystems that may create hazards. Emphasis should be given to those subsystems that store, transfer, or release energy. The descriptions of the safety-critical subsystems must be of sufficient detail to identify the hazards in terms consistent with the conceptual design. In addition, the PO shall address tentative plans for any flight operation (e.g., extravehicular activity, reverification of hazard controls) or ground operation that would require personnel certification to perform hazardous procedures.

6.2.2 Phase 0 Hazard Reports

The purpose of a phase 0 hazard report is to document and scope the specific hazards identified. It is intended to be a working document for discussion and critique at the phase 0 safety review and will not require signatures. A hazard report must be prepared for each unique hazard identified in the safety analysis. The hazards contained on the phase 0 hazard report must reflect the payload conceptual design and operations existing at the time of the phase 0 review. For phase 0, the PO may identify hazard controls, verification methods, or status of verifications.

6.3 PHASE I SAFETY REVIEW

The purpose of the phase I safety review is to obtain PSRP/GSRP approval of the updated safety analysis that reflects the preliminary design and operations scenario of the payload. At this point, the PO shall present a refined safety analysis that identifies all hazards and hazard causes inherent in the preliminary design; evaluates all hazards for means of eliminating, reducing, or controlling the risk; and establishes preliminary safety verification and on-orbit verification/reverification methods. The PO shall provide a preliminary identification of the payload interfaces and of the hazards presented by these interfaces.
6.3.1 Phase I Data Requirements

The following data are required for the phase I SDP and must be submitted as stated in paragraph 4.3.1:

a. For payload design and flight operations:

(1) Updated payload description (including subsystems) and mission scenario.

(2) Updated descriptions of safety-critical subsystems and their operations, including schematics and block diagrams with safety features, inhibits, and controls identified. Identify any safety-critical subsystems that are computer controlled, and identify the functional architecture associated with that computer control.

(3) Updated and additional flight hazard reports (e.g., JSC Form 542B/JSC Form 1230) including appropriate support data (see section 7). For payloads that have catastrophic hazard potential, document the verification program outlined in NSTS/ISS 18798.

(4) A summary list (in the payload description) of orbiter- and/or ISS program-provided critical services, and an explanation (in the appropriate hazard reports) of the orbiter and/or ISS services used to control and/or monitor payload hazards (NSTS 1700.7 and NSTS 1700.7 ISS Addendum, current version).

(5) For ISS payloads, a presentation of the Fire Detection and Suppression (FDS) implementation approach. For sub-rack payloads, the PO shall address the integrated system approach (using sub-rack services and/or ISS services) to fully define the FDS implementation strategy. In addition, submit JSC Form 1428 to document methods and verifications used to detect and suppress a fire event for each payload volume.

(6) Discussion of design features supporting verification/reverification of hazard controls on-orbit and associated constraints.

(7) A tabulated list of tentative toxic materials and support data per JSC 27472 (see section 4.3.1.4).

(8) A list of all battery types, their uses, manufacturer, and applications.

(9) A preliminary description of all pyrotechnic devices and their functions.

(10) Preliminary on-orbit maintenance safety assessment as outlined in NSTS/ISS 18798.

b. For GSE design and ground operations:

(1) Updated payload description and brief mission scenario.
(2) Updated descriptions of GSE, payload subsystems that present a potential hazard during ground processing, and their ground operations. Schematics and block diagrams with safety features and inhibits identified should be included. Design data for hazardous systems (pressure, lifting, etc.) shall be summarized in a matrix. Contact the GSRP Chairman for sample formats.

(3) Updated ground operations scenario including postflight ground operations at the primary, alternate, and contingency landing site. The scenario should highlight unique payload requirements at the launch pad, such as continuous power through a T-0 umbilical.
Updated ground hazard reports (JSC Form 542B) including appropriate support data.

Ordnance data required by the current version of KHB 1700.7, Appendix D.

Estimated KSC on-dock arrival date.

6.3.2 Phase I Hazard Reports

The PO shall prepare phase I hazard reports for each hazard identified as a result of the safety analysis for the preliminary design and operations scenario of the payload. Hazard reports shall be added to or deleted from those agreed to during phase 0 to reflect the updated safety analysis. Rationale for deleting a hazard agreed upon at phase 0 shall be presented during the phase I review.

For phase I, the PO shall identify hazard controls for each hazard cause identified at phase 0. A direct correlation between each hazard cause and the corresponding hazard control(s) must be clearly shown on the report. Sufficient supporting information detailing each hazard control must be provided.

Verifications should include the types of tests, analyses, inspections, or procedures to be used to verify each hazard control, including all orbiter- or ISS-provided services or interfaces, both prelaunch and on-orbit. A direct correlation between each verification method and the corresponding hazard control must be clearly shown on the report. Each verification item should be independent and have a designator that allows for individual tracking of verification status.

Manufacturing/assembly procedures/processes that are critical in controlling hazards that cannot or will not be verified by subsequent inspection or test must be verified during the manufacturing/assembly process. An independent verifier, as specified by the PO, shall attest to proper completion of the procedure/process. Critical procedures/processes, which require special monitored verification (Mandatory Inspection Points [MIPs]), shall be identified in preliminary fashion (NSTS 1700.7 and NSTS 1700.7 ISS Addendum, current version).

If available, the PO should provide a tentative schedule for completion of each verification task and correlate with the integration schedule.

6.4 PHASE II SAFETY REVIEW

The purpose of the phase II safety review is to obtain panel approval of the updated SDP that reflects the CDR-level design and operations scenario of the payload. The phase II safety analysis identifies all hazards and hazard causes; defines and documents implementation of a means for eliminating, reducing, or controlling the risks; and documents finalized, specific safety verification and on-orbit verification/reverification methods (test plans, analysis, and inspection requirements, etc.). Payload interfaces, mission and ground operations, procedures, and timelines that were not addressed during the phase I safety review shall be assessed for safety hazards. The payload interfaces to be assessed shall include those between the Shuttle and/or ISS and the payload and among the various components that make up the payload (the spacecraft, upper stages, space platforms, pallets, experiments, ASE, ancillary flight equipment, GSE, KSC Facilities, GFE, etc.). Newly identified hazards shall be documented in additional hazard reports. For this review, the PO should provide the estimated KSC on-dock arrival date.
6.4.1 Phase II Data Requirements

The following data are required from the PO for phase II and must be submitted as stated in paragraph 4.3.1:

a. For payload design and flight operations:

   (1) Updated payload description (including subsystems) and mission scenario.

   (2) Updated descriptions of safety-critical subsystems and their operations, including schematics and block diagrams with safety features and inhibits identified. Provide electrical schematics that clearly identify the required number of independent inhibits, controls, and monitoring provisions. Present a summary of the test and analytical efforts required to verify the intended performance of all safety-critical hardware.

   For a computer-based control system that is used to prevent critical/catastrophic hazards, provide the following data/descriptions:

   • Functional architecture
   • Expected interactions
   • Results of unexpected interactions
   • Protections for common cause failures
   • Development process for databases, hardware, software, and hardware/software

   (3) Updated and additional flight hazard reports (e.g., JSC Form 542B/JSC Form 1230), including appropriate support data (see section 7). For payloads that have catastrophic hazard potential, document the verification program outlined in NSTS/ISS 18798.

   (4) Updated summary list and explanation of orbiter- and/or ISS-provided critical services.

   (5) For ISS payloads, an update of the FDS implementation approach. Include information on use of forced air flow, wire derating, circuit protection, materials usage, parameter monitoring (fan speeds, temperatures, current, etc.) and responses to an out-of-limit condition, and suppression approach. For sub-rack payloads, the PO shall address the integrated system approach (using sub-rack services and/or ISS services) to fully define the FDS implementation strategy. Updated JSC Form 1428 to reflect specific test (or analysis) procedures to be used along with the schedule for completion of FDS verification tests, analyses, or inspections.
Verification methods associated with hazard controls that require on-orbit verification and/or reverification and the applicable approach (include rationale, constraints, and detailed methodology.)

An updated tabulated list of planned toxic materials and support data per JSC 27472 (see section 4.3.1.4). Updates should include changes in test materials, changes in test conditions, and any alternate test materials.

Updated list of all battery types, their uses, manufacturer, and applications.

A list of all pyrotechnic devices, their functions, chemical composition, critical components inspection plan, verification plan, and aging degradation evaluation plan.

List of hazard controls that require crew procedures and/or training.

A record of test failures, anomalies, and accidents involving qualification or potential flight hardware. Include a safety assessment for items which may affect safety.

The status of all action items assigned to the PO during phase I.

Detailed on-orbit maintenance safety assessment as outlined in NSTS/ISS 18798. Identify maintenance activities, safe access areas, and reverification of safety critical features.

For GSE design and ground operations:

Updated payload description and brief mission scenario.

Updated descriptions and matrices of the GSE, the payload subsystems that present a potential hazard during ground processing, and their ground operations. Include updated schematics and block diagrams with safety features and inhibits identified. Electrical schematics must show all payload/GSE grounding.

Updated ground operations scenario, including postflight ground operations at the primary, alternate, and contingency landing sites.

Updated and additional ground hazard reports (JSC Form 542B), including appropriate support data.

Updated ordnance data required by the current version of KHB 1700.7, Appendix D.

Updated KSC on-dock delivery date.

Specific engineering drawings and stress analyses of subsystems when requested by the GSRP Chairman.

A list of safety-related failures and mishaps that have occurred.
(9) The status of all action items assigned to the PO during phase I.

(10) A list of technical operating procedures that will be used at KSC with a preliminary designation as to which ones are considered hazardous.
6.4.2 Phase II Hazard Reports

The PO shall prepare the phase II hazard reports by revising the phase I hazard reports to reflect the completed payload design and flight/ground operating procedures. If the payload design changes from phase I to phase II so that a phase I hazard report may be deleted, present a brief statement of rationale for deleting the report in the phase II SDP. The GSRP/PSRP will disposition the hazard reports.

Address all critical procedures/processes, including the plan for verification. Verifications shall refer to specific test (or analysis) procedures and summarize pass/fail criteria to be used. Specify the schedule for the completion of each specific verification test, analysis, or inspection.

6.5 PHASE III SAFETY REVIEW

The purpose of the phase III safety review is to obtain PSRP/GSRP approval of the SDP and safety compliance data that reflects the safety verification findings. The focus of this review is to assess safety verification testing and analysis results. If verifications critical for establishing the acceptability of the fundamental design of the payload for safety are not completed prior to the phase III review, then subsequent reviews may be required prior to hazard report approval. All verifications that are open at the time of the phase III SDP submittal must be included on the safety VTL. Items listed on the VTL should be planned open work items, such as ground processing at KSC.

6.5.1 Phase III Data Requirements

The following data are required for the phase III SDP and must be submitted as stated in paragraph 4.3.1:

a. For payload design and flight operations:

   (1) Final as-built payload description (including subsystems) and mission scenario.

   (2) Updated descriptions that define the final configuration of the safety-critical subsystems and their operations, including schematics and block diagrams with the as-built payload safety features and independent inhibits, controls, and monitoring provisions identified. Address applicable features and constraints relating to on-orbit verification/reverification of hazard controls.

For a computer-based control system that is used to prevent critical/catastrophic hazards, provide verifications for the following:

- Functional architecture
- Expected interactions
- Results of unexpected interactions
- Protections for common cause failures
- Flight article databases, hardware, software, and hardware/software operate as designed
(3) Updated (and additional, if required) flight hazard reports, including support data that reflect the final configuration of the as-built payload and planned use. For payloads that have catastrophic hazard potential, document the verification program outlined in NSTS/ISS 18798.

(4) Final summary list and explanation of orbiter- and/or ISS-provided critical services.

(5) For ISS payloads, a finalized FDS implementation approach. Include information on use of forced air flow, wire derating, circuit protection, materials usage, parameter monitoring (fan speeds, temperatures, current, etc.) and responses to an out-of-limit condition. For sub-rack payloads, the PO shall address the final integrated system approach (using sub-rack services and/or ISS services) to fully define the FDS implementation strategy. Final JSC Form 1428 to summarize the results of the completed tests, analyses, and/or inspections and refer to particular test reports by document number, title, and date.

(6) Updated (and additional, if required) verification methods associated with hazard controls that require on-orbit verification and/or reverification and the applicable approach (include rationale, constraints, and detailed methodology).

(7) A final tabulated list of toxic materials and support data per JSC 27472 (see section 4.3.1.4), including additions and changes in test materials, changes in test conditions, and any alternate test materials.

(8) A final list of all battery types, their uses, manufacturer, and applications.

(9) A final list of all pyrotechnic devices installed or to be installed on the payload. The list will identify for each cartridge the function to be performed, the part number, the lot number, and the serial number.

(10) Updated list of hazard controls that require crew procedures and/or training.

(11) An updated record of test failures, anomalies, and accidents involving qualification or potential flight hardware or baselined flight software if the software is used for hazard control. Include a safety assessment for items which may affect safety.

(12) The status of all action items assigned to the PO through phase II.

(13) Payload Flight Safety VTL (JSC Form 764).
Identification of flight safety noncompliances. Flight safety NCRs must be approved as either a waiver or a deviation before the phase III safety review can be completed. A signed copy of each approved safety waiver and/or deviation shall be included in the phase III SDP attached to the appropriate hazard report.

Final/updated on-orbit maintenance safety assessment as outlined in NSTS/ISS 18798.

b. For GSE design and ground operations:

1. Final as-built payload description and brief mission scenario.

2. Updated descriptions and matrices defining the final configuration of the GSE, the payload subsystems that are potentially hazardous during ground processing, and their ground operations. Include updated schematics and block diagrams with the as-built safety features and inhibits identified.

3. Updated and finalized ground operations scenario, including postflight ground operations at the primary, alternate, and contingency landing sites.

4. Updated and additional ground hazard reports, including support data that reflect the final configuration of the as-built GSE and planned payload/GSE use.
(5) Updated and finalized ordnance data required by the current version of KHB 1700.7, Appendix D.

(6) Updated and finalized KSC on-dock delivery date.

(7) Specific engineering drawings and stress analyses of subsystems when requested by the GSRP Chairman.

(8) A summary and safety assessment of all safety-related failures and accidents applicable to payload processing, test, and checkout. Identify impact to the Space Shuttle, other payloads, and facilities.

(9) The status of all action items assigned to the PO through phase II.

(10) Finalized list of technical operating procedures that will be used at KSC with the hazardous procedures clearly identified. The list shall also state the proposed first use of the procedure at KSC.

(11) Verification that each payload flight system pressure vessel has a pressure vessel logbook that shows pressurization history, fluid exposure, and other applicable data. This verification should account for the planned testing at KSC.

(12) Payload Ground Safety VTL, if required.

(13) Certificate of Payload Safety Compliance (JSC Form 1114A) signed by the PO program manager for GSE design and ground operations.

(14) Procedural hazard control matrix that identifies hazard control criteria within the associated work-authorization documents for all procedural hazards. Contact GSRP Chairman for format.

(15) Identification of ground safety noncompliances. Ground safety noncompliances must be approved as either a waiver or a deviation before the phase III safety review can be completed. A signed copy of each approved waiver/deviation shall be included in the phase III SDP (see section 10).

6.5.2 Phase III Hazard Reports

The phase III hazard reports shall (1) reflect the final payload design and operations, and (2) document the status and results of all completed verification work. If the payload design is changed from phase II to phase III, so that a phase II hazard report may be deleted, provide in the phase III SDP a brief statement of rationale for deleting the report.

The phase III hazard reports shall reflect the as-built design and operations of the payload. By phase III, all safety analysis efforts should be completed. Verifications completed by phase III shall be indicated as such on the hazard report. This information shall summarize the results of the completed tests, analyses, and/or inspections and refer to particular test reports by document number, title, and date.
For those hazards controlled by the design-for-minimum-risk approach (per the current version of NSTS 1700.7, paragraph 200.2), in addition to data provided for phases I and II, the PO must provide additional data listed in section 7 of this document.

For payload systems having catastrophic hazard potential for the vehicle or crew as a result of operations in or near the vehicle, see paragraph 4.1.3.

6.5.3 Verification Tracking Log

All flight safety verifications that are still incomplete at Phase III, must be “closed” on the hazard report and transferred to the flight safety VTL for further tracking. This log will allow the PSRP Chairman to sign the hazard reports, indicating completion of the safety analysis, but with the understanding that approval for flight will be withheld until all flight verification activity is completed.

Similarly, all open ground verifications must be listed on the ground safety VTL. This log will allow the GSRP Chairman to sign the hazard reports, indicating completion of the ground safety analysis. Open ground verifications and open flight verifications that have been identified as a constraint against payload processing must be closed before the applicable ground operation can be performed.
SECTION 7
SUPPORTING TECHNICAL DATA SUBMITTALS

The information in this section applies to flight safety only, except for the data identified in sections 7.5 and 7.6, which applies to both flight and ground safety.

To further define the general data requirements in section 6, this section addresses SDP data submittals related to various technical disciplines to support hazard reports. Hazard reports (JSC Form 542 and Form 1230) must be supported by the minimum set of data as outlined below. Each such hazard report shall clearly identify the supporting data. This supporting data shall be submitted in one of the following manners: a) attached to the hazard report, b) as part of the SDP, or c) submitted to the PSRP Executive Secretary/GSRP Chairman. This official submittal path is not intended to preclude direct technical coordination between the PO and the appropriate JSC/KSC technical disciplines.

Technical areas of design, such as structures, pressure vessels, and pressurized lines, fittings, and components are typically Design-For-Minimum-Risk (DFMR) areas of design. The data submittal requirements in sections 7.1 and 7.2 are the minimum DFMR requirements for those particular design areas. The remainder of section 7 contains the minimum data submittals required by the PSRP for either DFMR or failure tolerant designs.

7.1 STRUCTURES

7.1.1 Phase I
Proposed Structural Verification Plan in accordance with NSTS 14046, “Payload Verification Requirements” and/or SSP 52005 “ISS Payload Flight Equipment Requirements and Guidelines for Safety Critical Structures.”

Fracture Control Plan.

Methodology for assurance of fastener integrity.

7.1.2 Phase II
Final structural verification plan, including: 1) summary of design loads derivation leading to critical load cases, and 2) math model verification plan.

Fracture control status (including parts categorization).

Identification of Material Usage Agreements (MUAs) on structural materials, the failure of which would cause a hazard (including, but not limited to, stress corrosion, hydrogen embrittlement, and materials compatibility).

7.1.3 Phase III
Summary of verification tests/analyses/inspections results.

Fracture control summary report.

New/approved MUAs as defined in phase II.

Documentation of compliance with fastener integrity program.
7.2 PRESSURIZED SYSTEMS (vessels, lines, fittings, components)

7.2.1 Phase I

Preliminary pressurized system schematic and operating parameters (e.g., temperature, pressure and other environmental conditions).

Preliminary summary of the derivation of system MDP(s) per NSTS 1700.7 and NSTS 1700.7 ISS Addendum.

Preliminary list of all system working fluids, their complete chemical composition, amounts, potential hazards (e.g., flammability, explosion, corrosion, toxicity) and hazard category (e.g., catastrophic, critical, nonhazard).

Summary of pressure vessel(s) design and qualification approach.

Damage control plan and stress rupture life assessment (COPVs only).

Fracture control plan.

Proposed pressurized system(s) verification approach for controls to ensure pressure integrity.

For fluids whose leakage is hazardous also include:

Proposed pressurized system(s) verification approach including controls to prevent leakage (e.g., levels of containment, Design for DFMR). For the DFMR approach to protect against leakage that may cause a catastrophic hazard include: 1) identification of mechanical fitting and leakage certification approach for wetted areas. Consider all environments where leakage is hazardous (e.g., in the Shuttle payload bay) and 2) preliminary identification of fusion and bi-metallic joints within the system.

7.2.2 Phase II

Complete and updated pressurized system schematic(s) and operating parameters, addressing all pressurized hardware.

Complete summary of the derivation of system MDP(s) per NSTS 1700.7 and NSTS 1700.7 ISS Addendum. Complete table of pressurized system hardware, MDP(s), proof pressure, ultimate pressure, resulting proof and ultimate safety factors and method of determining the safety factors (e.g., test, analysis, vendor data).

Updated list of all system working fluids, their complete chemical composition, amounts, identified hazards and hazard category.

Status on pressure vessel(s) design and qualification.

Fracture control status.

Identification of MUAs on pressurized system materials the failure of which would cause a hazard (including, but not limited to, stress corrosion, hydrogen embrittlement, and materials compatibility [including working and cleaning fluids]).
Final pressurized system(s) verification approach for controls to ensure pressure integrity including a summary of qualification and acceptance test plans and analyses. For fluids whose leakage is hazardous also include:

Final pressurized system(s) verification approach including controls to prevent leakage (e.g., levels of containment, DFMR). Include a summary of qualification and acceptance test plans and analyses. For the DFMR approach to protect against leakage that may cause a catastrophic hazard include: 1) summary of certification test plans and analyses to prevent leakage of wetted mechanical fittings, 2) identification of system fusion joints and their method of NDE. Identification of system bi-metallic joint(s), manufacturer and certification data, and 3) complete list of wetted materials and their compatibility rating with system and cleaning fluids. Define credible single barrier failures which may release fluid into a volume that is not normally wetted and provide a summary of maximum worst case temperatures which were considered.

7.2.3 Phase III

Final pressurized system schematic(s) and operating parameters, addressing all pressurized hardware.

Final MDP derivation summary and table of pressurized system hardware.

Final list of all system working fluids, their complete chemical composition, amounts, hazards and categories.

Certification of pressure vessel(s) design, including qualification and acceptance test results.

Fracture control summary report.

New/approved MUAs as defined in phase II.

For safe life and limited life pressure vessels, document existence of a Pressure Log, including log number.

Summary of results from verification tests/analyses/inspections for controls to ensure pressure integrity.

For fluids whose leakage is hazardous also include:

Summary of results from verification tests/analyses/inspections for controls to prevent leakage. For the DFMR approach to protect against leakage that may cause a catastrophic hazard include: 1) summary of results from certification tests and analyses on wetted mechanical fittings, 2) final list of system fusion joints and results from NDE. Final list of system bi-metallic joint(s), manufacturer(s) and certification data, 3) final list of wetted materials and their compatibility rating with system and cleaning fluids.

7.3 PYROTECHNIC DEVICES

7.3.1 Phase I

List of pyrotechnic devices and the functions performed.
7.3.2 Phase II
Detailed drawings of devices.
Chemical composition of any booster charge(s).
Inspection plan(s) for critical components.
Plan for evaluation of aging degradation.
Verification plan summary, including acceptance and qualification approach(s) (including margin demonstration), in accordance with NSTS 08060, “System Pyrotechnic Specifications.”

7.3.3 Phase III
Summary of verification tests/analyses/inspections results.

7.4 MATERIAL FLAMMABILITY, TOXICITY, AND COMPATIBILITY

7.4.1 Phase I
Approach used to assure materials compatibility.
A tabulated list of tentative toxic materials and support data per JSC 27472, “Requirements for Submission of Test-Sample Materials Data for Shuttle Payload Safety Evaluations” (see also section 4.3.1.4).

7.4.2 Phase II
Materials compatibility status.
Toxicological evaluation of test sample materials in accordance with JSC 27472.
Offgassing test plan.
Preliminary flammability assessment.

7.4.3 Phase III
Final materials compatibility status.
Update to toxicological evaluation of test sample materials in accordance with JSC 27472.
Flammability Assessment in accordance with NSTS 22648, “Flammability Configuration Analysis for Spacecraft Applications,” including a summary of flame propagation controls.
Offgassing test summary.
7.5 IONIZING RADIATION

7.5.1 Phase I
PSRP: Ionizing Radiation Source Data Sheet (JSC Form 44).

7.5.2 Phase II
PSRP: New/Updated JSC Form 44.

7.5.3 Phase III
PSRP: Approved JSC Form 44.

7.6 NON-IONIZING RADIATION

7.6.1 Phase I
PSRP: List of equipment that generates non-ionizing radiation (Radio Frequency (RF), light sources, lasers, etc.).

7.6.2 Phase II
PSRP: Updated list of equipment that generates non-ionizing radiation, including expected nominal operational characteristics of all non-ionizing radiation sources.

7.6.3 Phase III
PSRP: Final list of equipment that generates non-ionizing radiation, including actual nominal operational characteristics of all non-ionizing radiation sources.
7.7 PAYLOAD COMMANDING

7.7.1 Phase I
List of hazardous commands and implementation.

7.7.2 Phase II
Updated list of hazardous commands and detailed implementation plan.

7.7.3 Phase III
Verification of implementation plan.

7.8a ELECTRICAL (POWER, BONDING AND GROUNDING) SUBSYSTEMS

7.8.a1 Phase I
Preliminary power distribution schematic(s) showing wire sizing and circuit protection.
Preliminary bonding and grounding diagram/plan.

7.8.a2 Phase II
Updated power distribution schematic(s) showing wire sizing and circuit protection.
Final bonding and grounding diagram.

7.8.a3 Phase III
As-built power distribution schematic(s) that show wire sizing and circuit protection.
Summary of verification tests/analyses/inspection results for bonding and grounding.

7.8b AVIONICS CONTROL

7.8.b1 Phase I
Preliminary diagram of safety-critical subsystems, that indicate inhibits, controls, and monitors.
Preliminary verification approach for electrical safety-critical subsystems.
Identify any usage of orbiter and/or ISS electrical service to control a hazard.

7.8.b2 Phase II
Updated schematics of safety-critical subsystems that indicate inhibits, controls, monitors, and orbiter interfaces.
Verification approach (test pass/fail criteria) for each avionics leg of the hazard control/monitor subsystem, including test location (e.g., cargo integration test equipment stand [CITE], orbiter, payload rack checkout unit [PRCU], other) procedures, and test apparatus used in substantiating end function.

Provide a “payload hazard event table” listing the subsystem interface connector, pin number, payload function nomenclature, and whether the pin is command, monitor, or power.

7.8.b3 Phase III

As-built schematics of safety-critical subsystems that indicate inhibits, controls, monitors, and orbiter interfaces.

Summary of test results and summary of test procedures, including payload organization testing and/or fully integrated testing (e.g., CITE, orbiter, PRCU, or other).

As-built/final “payload hazard event table.”

7.8.c COMPUTER SYSTEMS (Avionics)

This section applies only to payload computer systems (as defined in SSP 50038 Appendix C) used to control hazardous functions.

7.8.c1 Phase I

Identify computer system hazard controls.

Describe the function(s) controlled by computer systems that prevent a hazard from occurring or control a hazardous function.

Describe the development process (including verification) of software/hardware and computer based control.

7.8.c2 Phase II

Describe the independence of computer and non-computer methods of hazard control.

Update the description of computer system hazard controls, and the function(s) controlled by computer systems that prevent a hazard from occurring or control a hazardous function.

Summarize the functional testing of the software/hardware, and describe the verification approach for the computer based hazard control system.

7.8.c3 Phase III

Provide a summary of results of computer based hazard control verification activity, including summaries of any failures/errors of the baselined flight software used for hazard control.
7.9 MECHANISMS IN CRITICAL APPLICATIONS

7.9.1 Phase I
Identification of safety-critical mechanisms.
Identification of areas of applicability of holding or operating force or torque margin requirements and planned verification approach (test or analysis).
Fracture control plan.

7.9.2 Phase II
Verification approach, including qualification and acceptance tests and analyses.
List of MIPs.
Fracture control status (including parts categorization).

7.9.3 Phase III
Report of verification tests/analyses/inspection results.
Fracture control summary report.
Report of verification tests/analyses/inspection results.
Fracture control summary report.

7.10 SOLID ROCKET MOTORS

7.10.1 Phase I
Preliminary schematic showing electrical inhibits, controls and monitoring provisions to prevent premature firing.
Preliminary characteristics of the solid rocket motor.
7.10.2 Phase II

Updated schematic showing electrical inhibits, controls, and monitoring provisions to prevent premature firing, including power sources, inhibit control command sources and static control devices. Independence of inhibits shall be clearly depicted.

Updated characteristics of SRM, including motor manufacturer, total mass and type of propellant, propellant formulation/ingredients, motor/propellant explosive classification, and case description.

Cutaway diagram of the initiator.

Diagram of the safe-and-arm device, indicating design and operation.

7.10.3 Phase III

Final schematic showing electrical inhibits, controls, and monitoring provisions to prevent premature firing, including power sources, inhibit control command sources, and static control devices. Independence of inhibits shall be clearly depicted.

Final characteristics of SRM, including motor manufacturer, total mass and type of propellant, propellant formulation/ingredients, motor/propellant explosive classification and case description.

A table listing the inhibits, when last cycled (actuated), and the final pre-launch state.

Final cutaway diagram of the initiator.

Updated diagram of the safe-and-arm device, indicating design and operation.

7.11 BATTERIES

7.11.1 Phase I

Preliminary list of type and number of battery cells, cell size (capacity), cell chemistry, cell manufacturer, and model number.

State whether on-orbit battery charging is intended.

7.11.2 Phase II

Updated list of type and number of battery cells, cell size (capacity), cell chemistry, cell manufacturer, and model number.

Circuit diagram including charging circuit showing compliance with NSTS 1700.7 and NSTS 1700.7 ISS Addendum. See guidelines in JSC 20793, “Manned Space Vehicle, Battery Safety Handbook.”

Charging characteristics and procedures, e.g., pulse charging, charge rate, trickle charge rate, and method of charge termination.
Diagram for battery boxes that indicates materials of construction, absorbent material, venting provisions, minimization of hydrogen accumulation from aqueous electrolyte batteries, protective coatings on battery box interiors and on exposed cell terminals, and cell physical retention techniques.

Verification plan, including qualification and acceptance tests.

Diagram of charging devices, characteristics, and implementation procedures.

Fracture control approach for battery cells where leakage causes a catastrophic hazard and for nickel-hydrogen batteries. (Refer to section 7.2 for data submittal on fracture critical pressurized components or pressure vessels).

7.11.3 Phase III

Final list of type and number of battery cells, cell size (capacity), cell chemistry, cell manufacturer, and model number.

Final circuit diagrams, including charging circuit showing compliance with NSTS 1700.7 and NSTS 1700.7 ISS Addendum. See guidelines in JSC 20793, “Manned Space Vehicle, Battery Safety Handbook.”

Final charging characteristics and procedures.

As-built diagram for battery boxes that indicates materials of construction, absorbent material, venting provisions, minimization of hydrogen accumulation from aqueous electrolyte batteries, protective coatings on battery box interior and on exposed cell terminals, and cell physical retention techniques.

Results of verification tests, analyses, and inspections.

Fracture control summary.

7.12 FLUID PROPULSION SYSTEMS

7.12.1 Phase I

Preliminary propulsion system schematic(s) and operating parameters (e.g., temperature, pressure, other environmental conditions, number of thrusters).

Preliminary summary of the derivation of system MDP(s) per NSTS 1700.7 and NSTS 1700.7 ISS Addendum.

Preliminary list of all system working fluids, their complete chemical composition, amounts, potential hazards (e.g., flammability, explosion, corrosion, toxicity) and hazard category (e.g., catastrophic, critical, non-hazard).

Summary of pressure vessel(s) design and qualification approach.

Fracture control plan.

Safe distance assessment and planned thrust level(s) used to determine it.
Preliminary schematic(s) showing flow control devices, their electrical inhibits and monitoring provisions to prevent premature firing. Proposed verification approach for controls to prevent premature firing.

Proposed propulsion system(s) verification approach for controls to ensure pressure integrity.

For fluids whose leakage is hazardous also include:

Proposed propulsion system(s) verification approach including controls to prevent leakage. To protect against leakage that may cause a catastrophic hazard include: 1) identification of mechanical fitting and leakage certification approach for wetted areas. Consider all environments where leakage is hazardous (e.g., in the Shuttle payload bay), 2) preliminary identification of fusion and bi-metallic joints within the system.

7.12.2 Phase II

Complete and updated propulsion system schematic(s) and operating parameters, addressing all pressurized hardware.

Complete summary of the derivation of system MDP(s) per NSTS 1700.7 and NSTS 1700.7 ISS Addendum. Complete table of propulsion system hardware, MDP(s), proof pressure, ultimate pressure, resulting proof and ultimate safety factors, and method of determining the safety factors (e.g., test, analysis, vendor data).

Updated list of all system working fluids, their complete chemical composition, amounts, identified hazards, and hazard category.

Status on pressure vessel(s) design and qualification.

Fracture control status.

Identification of MUAs on propulsion system materials the failure of which would cause a hazard (including, but not limited to, stress corrosion, hydrogen embrittlement, and materials compatibility [including working and cleaning fluids]).

Updated safe distance assessment and planned thrust level(s) used to determine it.

Updated schematic(s) showing flow control devices, and their electrical inhibits and monitoring provisions to prevent premature firing. Independence of inhibits shall be clearly depicted. Provide cut-away diagrams of the flow control devices. Final verification approach for controls to prevent premature firing.

Final propulsion system(s) verification approach for controls to ensure pressure integrity, including a summary of qualification and acceptance test plans and analyses.

For fluids whose leakage is hazardous also include:

Final propulsion system(s) verification approach, including controls to prevent leakage. Include a summary of qualification and acceptance test plans and analyses. To protect against leakage that may cause a catastrophic hazard, include: 1) summary of certification test plans and analyses to prevent leakage of wetted mechanical fittings, 2) identification of system fusion joints and their method of NDE. Identification of system bi-metallic joint(s), manufacturer, and certification data, 3) complete list of wetted materials and their compatibility rating with system and cleaning fluids.
Define credible single barrier failures which may release fluid into a volume that is not normally wetted and provide a summary of maximum worst case temperatures considered.

7.12.3 Phase III

Final propulsion system schematic(s) and operating parameters, addressing all pressurized hardware.

Final MDP derivation summary and table of propulsion system hardware.

Final list of all system working fluids, their complete chemical composition, amounts, hazards, and categories.

Certification of pressure vessel(s) design, including qualification and acceptance test results.

Fracture control summary report.

New/approved MUAs as defined in phase II.

For safe life and limited life pressure vessels, document existence of a Pressure Log, including log number.

Final safe distance assessment.

Final schematic(s) showing flow control devices, and their electrical inhibits and monitoring provisions to prevent premature firing. Summary of results from verification tests/analyses/inspections for controls to prevent premature firing.

Summary of results from verification tests/analyses/inspections for controls to ensure pressure integrity.

For fluids whose leakage is hazardous also include:

Summary of results from verification tests/analyses/inspections for controls to prevent leakage. To protect against leakage that may cause a catastrophic hazard, include: 1) summary of results from certification tests and analyses on wetted mechanical fittings, 2) final list of system fusion joints and results from NDE. Final list of system bi-metallic joint(s), manufacturer(s), and certification data, 3) final list of wetted materials and their compatibility rating with system and cleaning fluids.

7.13 SEALED CONTAINERS (STRUCTURES)

7.13.1 Phase I

List the name of each sealed container.

Provide preliminary identification of MDP, fluid(s), materials of construction for container enclosure, stored energy due to pressure, and environmental conditions.

Confirm/show sealed container meets design requirements per NASA-STD-5003 paragraph 4.2.2.4.2.3a.
The sealed container definition is in NASA-STD-5003 paragraph 3.39.

7.13.2 Phase II

List the name of each sealed container and verify that information furnished at Phase I is still valid. If not, identify and explain changes.

Provide preliminary summary of analyses and tests for each sealed container as required by pressure ratings and verification methods.

7.13.3 Phase III

List the name of each sealed container and verify that information furnished at Phase II is still valid. If not, identify and explain changes.

Provide final identification of MDP, fluid(s), materials of construction for container enclosure, stored energy due to pressure, and environmental conditions.

Provide final acceptance rationale for each sealed container including a summary of any required analyses and tests.
SECTION 8
VARIATIONS OF THE SAFETY REVIEW PROCESS

This section identifies variations of the safety review process described in section 6.

8.1 VARIATIONS FOR INTEGRATED MULTIPAYLOAD CARGO COMPLEMENTS

An integrated, multipayload cargo complement usually is an assembly of experiments mounted on or in a dedicated carrier, rack(s), module, or the orbiter or ISS. When an integrated, multipayload cargo complement has payload elements that are in various stages of development, the mission manager, who is responsible for integrating the payload into the orbiter or ISS, should submit separate SDPs for individual payload elements or appropriate groups for separate review.

The complete payload complement (all experiments and the carrier, rack, module, etc.), however, must be addressed together at an integrated phase III safety review. Hazards associated with the interaction between 1) two or more experiments, or 2) an experiment and the carrier, orbiter, or ISS must be addressed in an integrated hazard report and presented at phase III.

Many payloads will serve as "hosts" that provide services for experiments and other payloads. Developers that plan to extend host services to client experiments or payloads must document the adequacy of services that control hazards in a hazard report. Any limits or restrictions to the provided safety service must be clearly specified. The hazard report may reference a user's guide or Interface Control Document (ICD) as verification of hazard controls. Verifications apply to the overall design and include the specific verifications that assure that required services are present for each client experiment or payload. On-orbit verifications/reverifications must also be included.

8.2 VARIATIONS FOR ISS Payloads

Since ISS payloads are subject to differing development schedules, mobility of hardware on-orbit, potential on-orbit upgrades/modifications, and extended lifetimes, a modular data documentation and review strategy is encouraged. For payloads with multiple independent or unique systems, SDPs should be a compilation of payload system-level assessments that documents safety compliance of payload hardware and operations for each payload system. SDPs should have chapters for each of these systems and shall contain an integrated safety analysis at the rack or carrier level. Assessment will include on-orbit verification/reverification of hazard controls where applicable. Cumulative and unique integrated hazards should constitute the final SDP chapter. The rack integrator will perform integrated assessments for payloads co-manifested in a rack. The process defined in section 5, if applicable, allows a payload to progress through the payload safety process in accordance with its own schedule.

8.2.1 On-orbit Reconfigured Payloads

On-orbit reconfigured payloads are defined as payloads that while on-orbit either 1) will be physically reconfigured by modular substitution/addition, or 2) will experience a change in planned use or manifested location.

Safety assessments will be subject to the series/reflown hardware process detailed in section 9 and will address on-orbit verification/reverification of hazard controls.
8.2.2 Payloads Returning to Earth

Return payloads are defined as payloads or elements of payloads that are manifested for return from ISS on the STS.

Payloads that were launched on the Space Shuttle, transferred to the ISS, and later will be returned on the Space Shuttle must address all hazards for Space Shuttle delivery and transfer to ISS, ISS integration and operations, ISS deintegration, transfer to the Space Shuttle, and Space Shuttle return in the initial phase I/II/III safety data packages and hazard reports. If there have been changes to the payload hardware, safety assessments will be subject to the series/reflown hardware process detailed in section 9 and will address on-orbit verification/reverification of hazard controls and waste materials.

Payloads or hardware that were not launched on the Space Shuttle but will return on the Space Shuttle must meet the requirements of NSTS 1700.7B, NSTS1700.7B ISS Addendum, and KHB 1700.7. Safety assessments will be subject to the series/reflight reflown hardware process detailed in NSTS/ISS 13830C, section 9 and will address on-orbit verification/reverification of hazard controls. The analysis will identify hazard controls that must be verified while on-orbit; integrated hazards; and postlanding hazards or hazardous operations that occur at the primary, alternate, and contingency landing sites.
SECTION 9
REFLOWN AND SERIES PAYLOAD HARDWARE

Reflown hardware is defined as payloads or elements of payloads that have flown on the Space Shuttle or ISS and are manifested for reflight. Series flight hardware is defined as payloads or elements of payloads that are of the same or similar design as previously flown hardware (NSTS 1700.7 and NSTS 1700.7 ISS Addendum, current version). “Series” is not an applicable category for GSE. Variations to the procedures of section 6 have been developed for series payloads and reflown hardware to eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort from previously accomplished safety activity.

The PO is responsible for the safety of the total payload/GSE, including the series/reflown elements and associated interfaces. To fulfill this responsibility, the PO shall assess the previously approved safety data of the series/reflown payloads, payload elements, or GSE for applicability to the new payload and make all appropriate changes. Changes that may warrant revisions to baseline hazard reports include such things as hardware redesign, operational changes, or the need for additional controls. When any revisions are made to baseline hazard reports, a new, unsigned version shall be submitted as part of the reflight package.

The safety certification responsibility, as well as the number and depth of the safety reviews, will be discussed and negotiated with the PO at an early payload integration meeting.

The following unique data for series/reflown payloads, payload elements, and associated GSE shall be submitted (per section 4.3) as a Reflight SDP:

a. Identification of all series/reflown payloads, payload elements, and GSE to be used and the baseline safety analyses by document number, title, and release date. If chemicals are used, provide a new list, even though the chemicals are the same as those used previously.

b. Assessment of each series/reflown payload, payload elements, and GSE to indicate that the proposed use is the same as currently approved (analyzed and documented).

c. New or revised hazard reports, additional data, and identification of hazard reports that are no longer applicable based on the reflight application. Identification and assessment of changes in hardware/software and operations that have any safety impact, including on-orbit verification/reverification of hazard controls.

d. A copy of the approved baseline phase III hazard reports (attachments not required).

e. Report on the completion and results of applicable safety verifications. Submission of safety VTL (JSC Form 764) that identifies all safety verifications from the applicable baseline hazard reports that must be reverified for the reflight mission. In addition, open verifications from new hazard reports must be included.

f. Assessment of all safety noncompliances.

g. Assessment of limited life items for reflown hardware.
h. Description of maintenance, structural inspections, and refurbishment of reflown hardware and assessment of safety impact.

i. Assessment of all testing or ground/flight anomalies and failures during the previous usage of the series/reflown payload or payload element along with corrective action taken and rationale for continued use. (flight hardware/software only)

j. For flight reviews: A list of all pyrotechnic initiators installed or to be installed on the payload. The list will identify for each initiator the function to be performed, the part number, the lot number, and the serial number.

For ground reviews: Verification that each payload flight system pressure vessel has a pressure vessel logbook that shows pressurization history, fluid exposure, and other applicable data. This verification should account for the planned testing at KSC.

k. Ionizing and non-ionizing radiation forms for each source within the flight hardware or GSE. A definitive statement of non-use is required in the event that no radioactive materials or ionizing sources are present on the reflight payload.

l. For payloads that flew and were assessed for safety on either the shuttle or the ISS and are being reflown on the other vehicle: Results of the assessment of the payload with respect to the safety requirements of the new host vehicle (Flight safety only: current versions of NSTS 1700.7 for the shuttle and the NSTS 1700.7 ISS Addendum for the ISS).

m. A final list of procedures for ground processing (ground only).

SECTION 10
PAYLOAD SAFETY NONCOMPLIANCE REPORT

The PO shall meet all the requirements of the current versions of NSTS 1700.7, NSTS ISS 1700.7 Addendum, and KHB 1700.7 or obtain an approved safety waiver or deviation for each specific case of noncompliance. The PO shall document each noncompliance on an NCR (JSC Form 542C) and submit the form for disposition. Each NCR shall refer to the applicable payload element, subsystem, or component of the payload. Prior to the submittal of the NCR, appropriate rationale must be developed that defines the design features and/or procedures used to conclude that the noncompliant condition is safe. This rationale with supporting data shall be documented on the NCR. Approval of an NCR for the design or operation of one element, subsystem, or component of the payload will not relieve the PO of the responsibility to meet the requirement in any other element, subsystem, or component of the payload.

Flight NCRs must be approved as either waivers or deviations before the associated hazard report will be approved by the PSRP.

Ground NCRs must be approved as either waivers or deviations prior to the start of associated KSC ground operations that are impacted by the NCR.

10.1 NCR SUBMITTAL

All NCRs should be coordinated with the PSRP or the GSRP, as appropriate, prior to submittal and should be submitted as soon as it is determined that the safety requirement cannot be met. All NCRs must be signed by the payload Program Manager prior to submittal. The PO must ensure that the NCRs are processed through the appropriate control board.

NCRs for payload design and flight operations (JSC) shall be submitted to the PSRP Executive Secretary. For GSE design and ground operations, the NCR shall be submitted to the GSRP Chairman. If the NCR involves payload design that could have an impact on ground operations, the report shall be concurrently submitted to both the PSRP and the GSRP.

The GSRP has been granted the authority to approve NCRs that impact only ground processing and have no impact to the payload flight hardware design, flight operations, or flight safety.

The PO will be formally notified of the approval or denial of the Payload Safety NCR. When the SSP/ISS Program approves an NCR, it will be approved as either a waiver or as a deviation.

10.2 TYPES OF SAFETY NCRs

10.2.1 Waivers

When a safety waiver is granted, it is applicable for one flight and the PO has the responsibility to correct the noncompliant condition prior to reflight of the same payload or payload element, or prior to the flight of subsequent payloads of the same series.

10.2.2 Deviations

When a safety deviation is granted, the noncompliant condition may be approved for unlimited use. NCRs to be considered for a deviation will be those where the design, procedure, configuration, etc., does not comply with the safety requirement in the exact manner specified, but the intent of the requirement has been satisfied and a comparable or higher degree of safety is achieved.
SECTION 11
LIST OF FORMS

This section contains a list of the forms POs may use in the flight and ground safety review processes.

11.1 JSC FORMS

Current versions of the JSC forms are available in electronic format on the NASA/JSC Payload Safety Home Page. Contact the JSC PSRP Executive Secretary for the electronic address.

The PSRP will accept “equivalent” forms (i.e., those that contain all the required information) developed by the payload organization for the following:

- JSC Form 542B Hazard Report and Continuation Sheet
- JSC Form 764 Verification Tracking Log
- JSC Form 1114A Certificate of Safety Compliance

The PSRP, however, will not accept substitute “equivalent” forms for the following:

- JSC Form 44 Ionizing Radiation
- JSC Form 542C Noncompliance Report
- JSC Form 1230 Flight Payload Standardized Hazard Control Report
- JSC Form 1428 Fire Detection and Suppression Reporting Form

11.2 KSC FORMS

Contact the KSC GSRP Chairman for the KSC forms.

- KSC FORM 16-295 Radiation Use Request/Authorization (Radioactive Materials)
- KSC FORM 28-34 Radiation Use Request/Authorization (Ionizing Machine/Device)
- KSC FORM 16-294 Radiation Training and Experience Summary (Ionizing Radiation)
- KSC FORM 16-353 Modification of Radiation Use Authorization
- KSC FORM 16-447 Laser Device Use Request/Authorization
- KSC FORM 28-626 Optical Device Use Request/Authorization
- KSC FORM 16-451 Radiofrequency/Microwave System Use Request/Authorization
- KSC FORM 16-450 Training and Experience Summary (Nonionizing Radiation Users)
SECTION 12
APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS

The following documents are applicable to the extent stated herein. A list of current applicable documents may be obtained from the PSRP Executive Secretary or the GSRP Chairman.

- JSC 27472, “Requirements for Submission of Test Sample-Materials Data for Shuttle Payload Safety Evaluations” current issue.*
- NSTS 14046, “Payload Verification Requirements,” current issue.*
- NSTS/ISS 18798, “Interpretations of STS Payload Safety Requirements,” current issue.*
- JSC 20793, “Manned Space Vehicle, Battery Safety Handbook”

*Current issue includes all approved future changes and revisions.
APPENDIX A

DOCUMENT MATRIX
## DOCUMENT MATRIX

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SDP      Safety Data Package
SMP      Space Medicine Program
SR&QA    Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance
SSP      Space Shuttle Program
TIM      Technical Interchange Meeting
VTL      Verification Tracking Log